Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Similarity metrics: a measure of similarity. It is a problem in relation to possible worlds that it is not always determinable which one of two worlds is closer in relation to a third._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Robert Nozick on Similarity Metrics - Dictionary of Arguments
II 174 Similarity Metrics/Similarity/Possible Worlds/Nozick: the measure for the next world must be: what if the antecedent is true. - E.g. alphabetical order on the shelf: is an explanatory, not merely a representative order. - Why are the things there? >Order, >Possible worlds, >Cross world identity, >Explanation. Variant: content arranged, but coincidentally the same order - then the alphabetical order is not an explanation. - ((s) Then the neighborhood is no next world, but an irrelevant world.) II 241 Closure/Nearest World/Similarity Metrics/Nozick: when the condition (3) (believe nothing wrong) Condition (3) "If p would be false, S would not believe it" was to be completed, then, if p implies q, the non-q-situation must not be further away from the actual world than the nearest non-p-world. >Closure, >Omniscience/Nozick, >Real world, >Actuality. NozickVsClosure under known implication: we do not have to know or believe all the consequences of our knowledge. II 242 Closure/knowledge/Skepticism/Nozick: if our knowledge were closed under known implication, then if p implies q, the non-q-situation must not be further from the actual world than the nearest non possible world. >Brains in a vat, >Skepticism. Problem: when this is a "non-tank" world, then the statement would demand that the world of the skeptic does not exist, that the tank-world is not further away from the actual world, than any other non possible world. Problem: we would believe p, even if it is wrong, then we do not know that p. >Belief, >Knowledge. All conditionals, which say that we believe nothing wrong, would be wrong. >Conditional. Closed: would be the concept of knowledge only if the world of the skeptic might exist, if p were not true. So when our concept of knowledge would be so strong, skepticism would be right. >Stronger/weaker, >Strength of theories, >Concepts. Nozick: but we do not have to accept that._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
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> Counter arguments against Nozick
> Counter arguments in relation to Similarity Metrics
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-28